Since the announcement of Deutsche Bahn AG (DB) in 1994 for the project "Stuttgart 21" (S21) and the associated lowering of the main station went on the DB so far no concrete steps that suggest a rapid realization of the project. In spite of the DB-driven posturing which holds the state government continues to fascinate the project S21 finds this she lost not only the Masz but to the eye for the rest of the country. have to be Basel and its realization therefore be predicted - which has since operated transport policy is fixed solely to the S21, after the other very important projects such as the rapid expansion and construction of the trail Offenburg - Freiburg. This one-sided orientation of the country's policy on S21 and Abhängigmachung hinder all road projects of the S21 much needed expansion of transport infrastructure throughout BW. In Stuttgart, committed and later buried, while the "province" of which suffers. For example, the line Ulm - Friedrichshafen, still does not despite commitment by the Prime Minister in the state elections of 1996 electrified, rapid implementation is not to be expected. The construction of the aforementioned high-speed line Offenburg - Basel delayed unnecessarily and is also in the Federal Transport Infrastructure Plan does not receive a priority. The urgently to be implemented two-track extension of the line Horb - Rottweil - Tuttlingen (- singing) can also be delayed. Here, the state government is required to bring worthwhile projects to traffic and transportation for the speedy implementation.
The project S21macht the country on one side depending on the DB and therefore vulnerable to blackmail. Since the country is still at S21, it must act pleasing to the DB, at least until it is able to position itself clearly. This leads (e) ultimately results in the country most of its local transport services for years to DB awarded, a competition is held here no more, the DB can keep its monopoly position, the privatization of urban transport in BW is blocked for a long time, penetration of new suppliers into the market is systematically prevented.
The former head station in Stuttgart must be maintained in its present form, the existing railway tracks are to be optimized for the business process and streamlined the service station as planned to Untertürkheim move, So in the Stuttgart city center about 85% of the project from the previous S21 surface intended to be free. A new line of Esslingen Mettingen to Ulm is much cheaper and can now be realized thus independent of the Masznahmen in Stuttgart. The required connection to the airport to the ICE network is not the local traffic justified, the airport is gemäsz its regional significance to the regional rail network to link, this is the connection through the S-Bahn is sufficient to carry the construction of a tram line from Nürtingen to Filderstadt Bernhausen (- airport) the airport from the south would be more accessible.
S21 costs in the currently planned Form (1998), about 2.6 billion euros, of which would flow to carry out about 1.2 billion euros of taxpayers' money, then this money is needed elsewhere, while the proposed alternative would be a cost of 1.1 billion euros, much cheaper in both cases would have added about 1.43 billion € for the journey to Ulm. The
provided by the DB funding through land sales is questionable, the DB should pre-finance a significant part, because the land can be marketed properly so only after commissioning. At the opening of the station would have the DB will increase its debt further, a reduction of this is questionable to what Could lead to interest and repayment burdens weigh so heavy that no additional revenues are still insufficient sale proceeds to bring the project to profitability. This irresponsible debt policy at risk, ultimately, the planned flotation of DB, as hardly any investor should be willing to invest in a company that pays no return, the federal government would remain in the worst case on the DB sitting on a contribution from the taxpayer to save the DB would not be completely ruled out.
finally announced the head of the DB in the spring of 2003 that S21 will already cost more than planned and that the DB is not able to see, to bear these additional costs. When asked who they then finance, has no long answer search is required, it is the citizens.
